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Despite an auspicious start to independent statehood following British decolonisation 
in 1948, Sri Lanka soon dissipated its early promise in a quagmire of 
ethnonationalism, institutional decay, authoritarianism, and civil war.1 Compared to 
the complexity of many other Asian and African post-colonial states contending with 
ethno-territorial pluralism, including notably India, the Sri Lankan situation seems at 
first straightforward. Its ethno-territorial conflict stems from the Sinhala-Buddhist 
majority’s dominance over the island’s politics and government, and in response, the 
minority Tamils’ desire for self-government in the northeast. The ethnic division 
between Sinhalese and Tamils is thus replicated in a territorial cleavage between the 
‘south’ and the ‘northeast’, so that fairly conventional constitutional strategies of 
nation-building and power-sharing would seem adequate to accommodate these 
competing claims.2 Yet the conundrum is that the Sri Lankan state has consistently 
failed to devise a constitutional order in congruence with its societal pluralism, and, 
despite over half a century of reform attempts, this seemingly easy problem has so far 
defied resolution.  
 
This chapter focuses on one of the most concerted attempts made to find a 
constitutional resolution of the conflict: the Norwegian-facilitated peace process 
between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), roughly from 2001 to 2005. This process was marked in significant ways by 
methods associated with the liberal peace-building model, while simultaneously 
reflecting the closed and elitist character of Sri Lankan constitutional politics.3 Its 
failure led to a final phase of military conflict in which the government 
comprehensively defeated the LTTE in May 2009 and then, as victor, was hostile to 
any concessions to Tamil aspirations to regional autonomy—something which has 
                                                 
1 H. Kumarasingham (2013) A Political Legacy of the British Empire: Power and the Parliamentary 
System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka (London: I.B. Tauris): Ch.7. 
2 J. McGarry, B. O’Leary & R. Simeon, ‘Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in 
Conflict Regulation’ in S. Choudhry (Ed.) (2008) Constitutional Design in Divided Societies: 
Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford: Oxford University Press): Ch.2 at pp.85-7.   
3 C. Bell (2008) On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press): Chs. 2, 5; J. Goodhand, J. Spencer & B. Korf (Eds.) (2011) Conflict and 
Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap? (London: Routledge); K. Stokke & J. 
Uyangoda (Eds.) (2011) Liberal Peace in Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in Sri Lanka 
(London: Anthem Press). 
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changed only recently with a change of government. The chapter highlights various 
weaknesses of this model of conflict transformation and constitutional transition, in a 
context of limited constitutional imagination on both sides, hyper-competitive 
southern electoral politics, the breakdown of cohabitation at the centre, the failure to 
mitigate the effects of ethnonationalist antagonisms, and the critical absence of public 
participation. The failure to inform and engage sceptical constituencies in particular 
led to a significant democratic deficit in the process.  
 
Constantly harried by day-to-day challenges of political crisis management, the peace 
process never matured sufficiently for constitutional negotiations of any depth to take 
place, although the parties did manage on one occasion to articulate the fundamental 
principles of a constitutional settlement, embodied in the Oslo Communiqué of 
December 2002, that may well be of relevance for the future. The election of a more 
moderate government in January 2015, the successful enactment of several 
democratic and governance reforms in May, the election of a new Parliament in 
August in which moderate parties across the ethnic divide have emerged victorious, 
and the commencement in March 2016 of a constitutional reform process through 
Parliament sitting as a Constitutional Assembly, give rise to cautious optimism that 
devolution reforms will follow.4 But it remains so far the story of a failure, from 
which, nonetheless, lessons can hopefully be drawn as Sri Lanka embarks on a new 




The Sri Lankan polity is characterised by rich ethnic and religious pluralism, albeit 
with an overwhelming Sinhala-Buddhist majority of almost 75 per cent of the 
population, which sees itself as the historic national community of the island.5 In the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist worldview, the island is the only homeland of the 
Sinhalese people, who are, moreover, the inheritors of a sacred duty to preserve and 
protect Theravada Buddhism. This is the heritage of race and religion that the 
Sinhala-Buddhists have defended with much sacrifice and resilience against South 
                                                 
4 A. Welikala, ‘Sri Lanka’s Long Constitutional Moment’ (2015) The Round Table 104(5): pp.551-62. 
For frequently updated research on the ongoing constitutional reform process, see: 
http://constitutionalreforms.org 
5 According to the latest (and first post-war) 2012 census, the total population of Sri Lanka is 
20,359,439, of which Sinhalese are 15,250,081 (74.9%), the Sri Lankan Tamils 2,269,266 (11.15%), 
Sri Lankan Moors (Muslims) 1,892,638 (9.3%), and the Indian Tamils 839,504 (4.12%): Department 
of Census and Statistics (2012) Census of Population and Housing of Sri Lanka 2012 (Colombo: 
Government of Sri Lanka): Table A3, available at: 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/Activities/Reports/FinalRep
ort/Population/FinalPopulation.pdf (last accessed 4th April 2017). 
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Indian Tamil-Hindu and European-Christian invaders from time immemorial. These 
central elements of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism are elaborated and reproduced in a 
powerful tradition of historiography, which continues to inform contemporary 
political and cultural discourse, in particular in relation to a specific view of the form 
and foundations of the Sri Lankan state.6 In this view, there is no distinction between 
the collective identity of the ethnic majority and the Sri Lankan nation-state.7  
 
It follows from this that ethnic and religious (and indeed, ideological) minorities are 
expected to acknowledge the primacy of the majority’s political and cultural 
dominance over the historical and territorial space of the state. Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism is therefore unequivocally hegemonic, but it is not assimilationist; 
minorities enjoy tolerance of their distinctiveness to the extent commensurate with the 
dominant nation’s view of its primacy, meaning that constitutionally the Sri Lankan 
state must be unitary in form, foster Buddhism, and privilege the Sinhala language 
and culture. The commitment to the unitary state is important both symbolically and 
substantively. Symbolically, it is the modern continuation of the ancient Sinhala-
Buddhist state tradition, in which an encompassing monarchy was the synecdoche of 
a hierarchical social order and state8 (this justification is also strongly implied in 
modern arguments in favour of centralising presidentialism9). Most importantly, it 
registers a clear constitutional rejection of Tamil territorial claims to federal 
autonomy. Thus substantively, the centralisation of power and authority in the unitary 
state ensures that executive and legislative institutions are permanently under 
majoritarian control.10  
 
This forceful nationalism has been politically ascendant ever since independence, 
shaping and defining the character of the Sri Lankan nation-state at every significant 
constitutional moment, and permeating the discourse and practice of ordinary 
electoral politics. Thus, soon after independence, legislation was enacted to deprive 
                                                 
6 S.J. Tambiah (1991) Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press): pp.93-102. 
7 M. Roberts, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Perspectives: Barriers to Accommodation’ 
(1978) Modern Asian Studies 12(3): pp.353-76.  
8 R. de Silva Wijeyeratne (2014) Nation, Constitutionalism and Buddhism in Sri Lanka (London: 
Routledge): Ch.4. 
9 A. Welikala, ‘Nation, State, Sovereignty and Kingship: The Pre-Modern Antecedents of the 
Presidential State’ in A. Welikala (Ed.) (2015) Reforming Sri Lankan Presidentialism: Provenance, 
Problems and Prospects (Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives): Ch.13, available at: 
http://srilankanpresidentialism.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/21-Welikala.pdf (last 
accessed 4th April 2017). 
10 A. Welikala, ‘The Sri Lankan Conception of the Unitary State: Theory, Practice and History’ in A. 
Amarasingham & D. Bass (Eds.) (2016) Sri Lanka: The Struggle for Peace in the Aftermath of War 
(London: Hurst & Co.): Ch.2. 
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citizenship rights from large sections of the Indian Tamil population.11 In 1956, the 
‘Sinhala Only Act’ sought to make Sinhala the sole official language.12 During the 
late 1950s and mid-1960s, attempts at introducing a bilingual official language policy 
and devolution to Tamil-majority areas were derailed by processes of ethnic 
outbidding among the major political parties within the south. The non-discrimination 
and minority protections of the independence constitution had proved ineffective in 
the hands of a deferential judiciary, and when the country became a republic in 1972, 
the unitary state, a ‘foremost place’ for Buddhism, and the primacy of Sinhalese, were 
all constitutionally enshrined.13 The Constituent Assembly, which drafted and enacted 
the first republican constitution, completely rejected Tamil demands for equal 
treatment, secularism, and especially federal autonomy.14  
 
The Sri Lankan Tamils, distinct from the Indian Tamils and the largely Tamil-
speaking Muslims, see themselves as the other historic national community within the 
island. 15  There is little doubt about their historic presence in the island and the 
legitimacy of their constitutional claims on this basis. But this is not to say that Tamil 
nationalist ideology always presents convincing arguments about its claims, 
illustrated, for example, by Tamil nationalism’s attempts to encompass the Muslims 
of the north and east within the Tamil nation under the rubric of ‘Tamil-speaking 
people.’ Muslims however have resisted this attempt at assimilation and insisted on 
their separate religion-based identity.16      
 
Sri Lankan Tamil claims to constitutional accommodation are based on three 
principles: that they are a distinct nation, with a traditional homeland in the northeast 
                                                 
11 The Indian Tamils, also sometimes known as Upcountry Tamils or Estate Tamils, are Tamils brought 
down from Southern India as indentured labour for tea, rubber and coffee plantations during the British 
colonial era. While a large number were repatriated to India in stages after independence, they are still 
the dominant ethnicity in plantation labour in the central hill country. They are distinct from the 
indigenous Sri Lankan Tamils who originate in the northern and eastern regions of the island, and they 
make no territorial claims. 
12 N. DeVotta (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri 
Lanka (Stanford: Stanford University Press): Ch.4. 
13 R. Edrisinha, ‘Sri Lanka: Constitutions without Constitutionalism: A Tale of Three and a Half 
Constitutions’ in R. Edrisinha & A. Welikala (Eds.) (2008) Essays on Federalism in Sri Lanka 
(Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives): Ch.1. 
14 N. Jayawickrama, ‘Reflections on the Making and Content of the 1972 Constitution: An Insider’s 
Perspective’ in A. Welikala (Ed.) (2012) The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections on Constitutional 
History, Theory and Practice (Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives): Ch.1, available at: 
http://republicat40.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Reflections-on-the-Making-and-Content-of-the-
1972-Constitution1.pdf (last accessed 4th April 2017). 
15 Tambiah (1991): pp.102-13. 
16 F. Haniffa, ‘Conflicted Solidarities? Muslims and the Constitution-making Process of 1970-72’ in 
Welikala (2012): Ch.5 at pp.228-38; Z. Ahmad, ‘Contours of Muslim Nationalism in Sri Lanka’ (2012) 
South Asian History and Culture 3(2): p.269. 
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of the island, and entitled on these grounds to the right to self-determination.17 On this 
basis, they have asserted an entitlement to self-government, whether in the form of 
autonomy within a federal Sri Lankan state, or, if not, as a separate state. Under the 
British, the Tamils had been content to regard themselves as a minority (albeit 
historically coeval with the Sinhala majority), and to seek representation in the 
colonial state on that basis.18  Industrious and educated, the Tamils, or at least a 
prominent Tamil elite, gained disproportionate social advancement under British 
colonialism compared to the Sinhalese, although the land-owning Sinhalese colonial 
elite was always the dominant faction. Nevertheless, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists fed 
upon, and contributed to, the perception that Tamils were colonial lackeys whose 
social and economic successes were at the cost of poor Sinhalese in their own land.  
 
As the prospect and potential of Sinhala-Buddhist domination became more apparent 
after independence, the Tamils rearticulated their collective identity as a distinct 
nationality, with a demand for federal autonomy. The Federal Party, the main vehicle 
of parliamentary Tamil nationalism even today, was established in 1949 for this 
purpose.19  Deteriorating ethnic relations and the Tamils’ sense of beleaguerment, 
especially after the Sinhala Only Act, have ensured that parties committed to the 
Tamil national, territorial, and self-determination claims have won majorities in every 
election in the north and east since 1956. The Tamils’ consistent commitment to these 
principles was even affirmed in the several rounds of post-war elections after 2009, 
notwithstanding the devastating military defeat of the LTTE. 
 
In the first two decades after independence, the Federal Party’s various attempts to 
negotiate official bilingualism, devolution (short of federalism), and equitable 
solutions to discriminatory measures (such as affirmative action favouring rural 
Sinhala youth for university entry) had been unsuccessful. Recourse to courts and 
constitutional safeguards also proved largely unfruitful. Particularly notable, in 
anticipating the pattern of failure of future agreements, was the government’s 
unilateral abrogation—under pressure from its Sinhala-Buddhist constituency—of the 
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1958, signed between the prime minister and 
the leader of the Federal Party,20 which would have provided for bilingualism and 
some territorial autonomy for the northeast. When the Constituent Assembly of 1970-
                                                 
17 R. Edrisinha, M. Gomez, V.T. Thamilmaran & A. Welikala (Eds.) (2008) Power-Sharing in Sri 
Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents, 1926-2008 (Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives): 
Ch.15. 
18 A.J. Wilson (2000) Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries (New Delhi: Penguin): Ch.4. 
19 Ibid: Ch.6. 
20 Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch.9. 
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72 peremptorily rejected the Federal Party’s rather conservative scheme for a federal 
constitution, militant groups overtook the parliamentary Tamil nationalists. The 
militants were Tamil youth radicalised by discrimination as well as revolutionary 
doctrines of the era. They demanded a separate state and advocated armed struggle to 
achieve it.21 The humiliation inflicted by the first republican constitution in 1972 
united the parliamentary and militant nationalists in a 1976 convention, which passed 
the ‘Vaddukoddai Resolution’ calling for a separate, independent state of ‘Tamil 
Eelam’ for the first time.22  
 
A low-intensity insurgency commenced during this period with a proliferation of 
armed youth groups fighting Sri Lankan armed forces, and, indeed, each other in 
vying for dominance of Tamil nationalist politics. This transformed into a full-scale 
civil war between these groups and the Sri Lankan government after the anti-Tamil 
pogrom of July 1983.23 Following the killing of an army patrol in the Jaffna peninsula 
by Tamil terrorists, the Sri Lankan government aided and abetted a riot against Tamil 
civilians in the south, especially Colombo, with massive loss of life, destruction of 
property, and displacement.24 The Indian government was now drawn into the conflict 
because of widespread support among Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu for 
their co-ethnics in Sri Lanka. Indian mediation led to the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, 
by which the Sri Lankan government undertook to establish provincial councils for all 
nine provinces—though the main objective was the devolution of power to the new 
North-Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC). These changes were introduced by the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the 1978 Constitution and other consequential legislation. 
The settlement included the ‘merger’ of the existing Northern and Eastern Provinces 
into one administrative unit, so as to encapsulate the region of historical Tamil 
habitation.25  
 
India undertook to disarm the rebels and ensure their compliance with the settlement.  
It succeeded except for the LTTE, which rejected the Accord and began a military 
campaign against the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) of approximately a hundred 
thousand troops at peak. The militant groups who had accepted the Accord and 
assumed control of the NEPC soon encountered an uncooperative central government 
that obstructed meaningful implementation of devolution. Frustrated, the NEPC 
                                                 
21 Wilson (2000): Ch.7. 
22 Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch.12. 
23 K. Loganathan (1996) Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict 
(Colombo: Centre for Policy Research and Analysis): Ch.4. 
24 While no wholly reliable figures exist, a widely cited estimate is that some 150,000 Tamils were 
displaced as a result of the pogrom, and well over 1000 and up to 3000 killed. See N. Murray, ‘The 
State Against the Tamils’ (1984) Race & Class XXVI (1): p.97 at p.106.   
25 Ibid: Ch.5; Edrisinha et al (2008): Chs.16-17.  
 7 
attempted a unilateral declaration of independence in 1991. The central government 
responded by dissolving the NEPC and suspending devolution in the province. After 
the departure of the IPKF, hostilities between the LTTE and the government 
continued, interspersed with brief ceasefires and half-hearted attempts at 
negotiation.26  
 
This period also saw the LTTE’s consolidation of its hold on Tamil politics, which 
would end only with its battlefield defeat in 2009. The LTTE proved ruthless in its 
use of terror against opponents. Its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s single-minded 
pursuit of an independent Tamil Eelam became invested with a sense of nationalist 
purity and authenticity; other militant groups and political parties were seen as too 
willing to cut deals, or in hock with Indian interests if not with the Sri Lankan state. 
Prabhakaran’s campaign of unrestrained violence against more moderate Tamil 
politicians, intellectuals, and other militant groups bore fruit in 2001, when just ahead 
of the parliamentary elections of that year, nearly all the remaining mainstream 
politicians and ex-militants, including the venerable Federal Party, formed the Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA). While ostensibly an attempt to ensure a single Tamil voice 
in future negotiations, it was in reality the subordinate electoral arm of the LTTE, 
founded on the principle that the LTTE was the ‘sole and authentic’ representative of 
the Tamil people. It is testament to how far the Sri Lankan state had radically 
alienated the Tamil people that such a violently anti-pluralistic and autocratic force as 
the LTTE was able to capture, barring a few courageous individuals, the imagination 
of an entire community as the only plausible agent of its liberation from oppression.27 
Yet it is also true that the LTTE’s dominance was as much due to its unparalleled 
capacity to crush dissenting voices within the Tamil community.         
 
In 1994, the People’s Alliance (PA) government assumed power with a commitment 
to a negotiated settlement and a broadly liberal attitude to devolution and power-
sharing. Its preliminary talks with the LTTE however soon collapsed, whereupon the 
PA adopted its ‘War for Peace’ policy. This involved waging war on the LTTE while 
inviting all other parties to deliberate on constitutional reforms within a parliamentary 
select committee, which included the Federal Party and other Tamil parliamentary 
parties. The government published a series of proposals in 1995, 1996, 1997, and, in 
2000, it presented a draft Constitution Bill to Parliament.28 None of the PA proposals 
won sufficient support in Parliament to be enacted.  Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists 
                                                 
26 Loganathan (1996): Ch.5. 
27 See also, J. Richards (2014) An Institutional History of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
CCDP Working Paper No.10 (Geneva: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding). 
28 Edrisinha et al (2008): Chs.21-26; S. Bastian (Ed.) (2006) Sri Lanka: The Devolution Debate (5th 
Ed.) (Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies). 
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were in uproar about the government’s conciliatory approach, and the war with the 
LTTE showed no signs of a rapid conclusion. Following a series of military setbacks 
for the government, including debilitating terrorist attacks in the south, the 
parliamentary election in December 2001 was won by the opposition United National 
Front (UNF) on a clear promise to call a ceasefire and enter into negotiations with the 
LTTE. In the northeast, the newly formed TNA swept all the seats, reflecting its role 
in bringing all major Tamil groups and parties together as well as the LTTE’s control 
of large parts of the area.  
 
The election resulted in control of parliament and the presidency being divided 
between the two main parties, which was the first occurrence of ‘cohabitation’ within 
the semi-presidential constitution adopted in 1978. The independently elected 
executive president from the PA, Chandrika Kumaratunga, was compelled to appoint 
a prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, and a cabinet from the new UNF 
parliamentary majority. The ‘dual-mandate’ of cohabitation seemed promising at first. 
While there was little disagreement between Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe on 
the fundamentals of a political solution – both were committed to some form of 
federal-type devolution – the question was whether they could transcend the highly 
competitive nature of Sri Lankan party politics, build a southern consensus in 
negotiating with the LTTE, and share credit in achievements. It was in this context of 
cohabitation in the south, as well as the LTTE’s strong military position and 
substantial control of territory in the north and east, that the Norwegian government 
was invited to facilitate a ceasefire with a view to commencing negotiations. Prior to 
discussing this peace process, is necessary to examine the territorial dimension of the 
Sri Lankan conflict more closely.  
 
Among all the claims associated with the Tamil challenge, none has caused greater 
controversy or resistance than the claim to a ‘Tamil traditional homeland’ in the 
northeast of the island. Opponents dispute both the historical rationale and the 
purported physical boundaries, and they include not only Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists but also those who fear such an ethnic enclave would pose an anti-modern 
threat to building a civic culture for the Sri Lankan nation-state.29  
 
Intertwined with the territorial claim is a disputatious debate about the demography of 
the north and especially the east. The Federal Party’s original political programme 
opposed Sinhalese ‘colonisation’ of the east through state-aided programmes of 
                                                 
29 H.L. de Silva (2008) Sri Lanka: A Nation in Conflict: Threats to Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, 
Democratic Governance and Peace (Colombo: Visidunu Prakashakayo); D. Jayatilleka (2014) Long 
War, Cold Peace: Sri Lanka’s North-South Crisis (Rev. Ed.) (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa). 
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agricultural resettlement because it altered the area’s demographic balance. Tamil 
nationalists have seen colonisation as insidious demographic engineering designed to 
consolidate Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony over the whole island and render Tamils a 
minority even in Tamil areas. Considerable credence can be attached to this especially 
once colonisation became a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideological issue after the 
watershed election of 1956. However, earlier colonisation policy by the British 
colonial administration, and later by Ceylonese politicians and civil servants under the 
Donoughmore dispensation,30 were technocratic, not ideological, attempts to develop 
sparsely populated agricultural lands by resettling Sinhala peasants in them, thus 
easing pressure on agricultural land in the island’s southwest and centre.31  
 
Thus, those who stress the economic imperatives of resettlement as the basis of the 
colonisation policy, see the homeland argument as historically spurious Tamil 
nationalist myth-making. 32  There are two facets to how the Tamil nationalist 
territorial claim was articulated (and contested) in the post-independence period that 
require consideration: namely, what Tamil nationalists have meant by the concept of a 
‘Tamil traditional homeland’, and what they have seen as its physical boundaries.  
 
Hellmann-Rajayanagam, who notes that the term ‘homeland’ is “used loosely and is 
nowhere defined in the literature”, 33  dates its occurrence in English language 
discourse in Ceylon to legislative debates and memoranda of the 1930s. She suggests 
that it is an English “translation of a term widely used in the Tamil writings” which 
literally means “Regions where Tamil-speaking people have traditionally (or from 
generation to generation) lived.”34 From the evidence she and others have offered, it 
seems that the idea of a traditional homeland, even though its exact boundaries were 
amorphous, was a politically resonant and commonly accepted notion among Tamils.  
Critically, it preceded the Federal Party’s presentation of Tamil politico-constitutional 
claims in terms of a distinct nation from 1949 onwards.35  
 
Moreover, Sinhalese opposition to a Tamil traditional homeland appears to have 
intensified only once it was asserted as part of a Tamil national claim. As Hellmann-
                                                 
30 M. Roberts, ‘Narrating Tamil Nationalism: Subjectivities and Issues’ (2004) South Asia: Journal of 
South Asian Studies 17(1): p.87 at pp.106-108; D. Hellmann-Rajanayagam, ‘The Concept of a ‘Tamil 
Homeland’ in Sri Lanka – Its Meaning and Development’ (1990) South Asia 13(2): p.79 at p.95. 
31 Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1990): pp.93-95, 103-106. 
32 K.M. de Silva (2013) The ‘Traditional Homelands’ of the Tamils: Separatist Ideology in Sri Lanka: 
A Historical Appraisal (3rd Rev. Ed.) (Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies); G.H. Peiris, ‘An 
Appraisal of the Concept of a Traditional Homeland in Sri Lanka’ (1991) Ethnic Studies Report IX (1). 
33 Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1990): p.81. 
34 Ibid: p.82. 
35 A.R. Arudpragasam (1996) The Traditional Homeland of the Tamils (Colombo: Kanal Publications).  
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Rajanayagam has argued, in the debates over territorial and communal representation 
in the early twentieth century, the notion that the north and east were not merely 
Tamil-speaking majority areas, but were ‘Tamil homelands,’ seems to have been 
assumed by Tamils and Sinhalese alike. Indeed, as she further argues, in the run-up to 
independence, Sinhalese leaders met Tamil demands for special constitutional 
protections against Sinhalese dominance with the argument that Tamils would obtain 
sufficient territorial representation under democracy because of their preponderance 
in the northeast.36 During the period between the late 1930s and independence in 
1948, the dominant Tamil demand was for a proto-consociational scheme of 
representation at the centre known as ‘50-50’, which envisaged, not federalism as 
after the Federal Party’s emergence in 1949, but legislative representation on the basis 
of 50 per cent of seats for the Sinhalese and 50 per cent for the minorities. The 
scheme’s rationale was to offset the dominance of the Sinhalese and guarantee 
minority representation, but it was rejected by the Soulbury Commission which 
recommended the independence constitution.37 
 
The absence of precisely demarcated boundaries to the homeland has created 
difficulties for the Tamil territorial claim as a legal and constitutional proposition. 
This is evidenced in the shifting nature of the territorial claim. The Federal Party’s 
founding manifesto in 1949 merely stated, “The Eelam Tamils are a nation of their 
own, they have a homeland of their own.”38 Resolution No. 1 at its First National 
Convention in 1951 asserted Tamils’ “territorial habitation of definite areas which 
constitute over one-third of this Island,” but nevertheless called for “a plebiscite to 
determine the boundaries of the linguistic states” of the future federation.39 It was 
more specific in the Memorandum and Model Constitution submitted to the 
Constituent Assembly in 1971, which set out a federal scheme for the future 
republican constitution.  This proposed that, “The Northern Province and the 
Trincomalee and Batticaloa Districts of the Eastern Province will form one Unit. This 
will be a Tamil majority State. The Amparai District [in the southwest end of the 
Eastern Province] will form a Muslim majority State.” 40  In the Vaddukoddai 
Resolution of 1976, which registered Tamil nationalism’s paradigm shift from 
federalism to secessionism, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) identified the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces as the territory of the future state of Tamil Eelam. 
Since then, Tamil nationalists have generally put forward the Northern and Eastern 
                                                 
36 Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1990): p.83. See also W.I. Jennings (1953) The Constitution of Ceylon (3rd 
Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press): pp.6-8. 
37 Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch.6. 
38 Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1990): p.82. 
39 Edrisinha et al (2008): p.212. 
40 Ibid: p.140. 
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Provinces as the territorial extent of the Tamil homeland, although more maximalist 
claims have been made.41 
 
While it is generally conceded by all except the most recalcitrant Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists that the Jaffna Peninsula and most of the Northern Province are areas of 
historic Tamil habitation, the Tamil claim to historic habitation in the rest of the area 
comprising the Northern and Eastern Provinces has been constantly challenged.42 
These territorial disputes have concentrated on the areas to the interior of the Eastern 
littoral and the interior areas between the North-Central Province and the southern 
end of the Northern Province. This vast area, the whole of which was once known as 
the Vanni, was until the 1930s universally regarded as a “wild country … covered in 
jungle, full of wild animals … and malaria-infested swamps.”43 Notwithstanding this, 
it was the transition from communal to territorial representation in the late colonial 
period that made the Tamils realise that, rather than being one of the two founding 
nations in the island as they had hitherto regarded themselves, they too were now a 
minority in a Sinhala-majority polity. From the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 
1829-33 to the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931, the model of (limited) native 
representation in the colonial state was on a communal basis. The various reforms in-
between adjusted the number of representatives allocated to the Sinhalese, Tamils, 
Moors, and Burghers in legislative and executive councils. However, in 1931 the 
Donoughmore Constitution introduced universal franchise, bringing with it the radical 
innovation of territorial democracy. This new model of territorial democracy – 
idealistically but perhaps naively – sought to encourage Ceylon’s people to shed their 
communal identities and build a civic ‘Ceylonese’ identity in moving towards fully 
responsible government.44  
 
The expectation that universal franchise would promote modern political parties and 
reframe political competition along ideological or policy programmatic lines turned 
out to be misplaced. Instead, political mobilisation not only continued along 
communal lines but also gave Sinhalese politicians the awareness that they were now 
transformed into a governing class with a perpetual majority. This strengthened the 
Tamils’ resolve to protect their identity and preserve its homeland. Thus, even before 
peasant colonisation in the northeast became invested with a Sinhala-Buddhist 
ideological mission to negate Tamil claims to the territory, Tamils strongly resisted it. 
This is why the spatial possession of a homeland assumed such fundamental 
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significance to the Tamil identity and sense of dignity, even if large parts of the area 
claimed as a homeland were sparsely populated and undeveloped.45  
 
The Period of Constitutional Engagement 
 
By the time we come to the specific period of constitutional engagement on the ethno-
territorial question that is the focus of this chapter, Sri Lanka’s conflict had reached a 
‘mutually hurting stalemate’46 with neither side in the armed conflict able to deliver a 
knockout blow (although in retrospect, not so mutually hurting as to convince either 
side that war was no more an option).47 The exploration of a third party facilitator had 
begun much earlier than the election of the UNF-led cohabitation government in 
December 2001, when President Kumaratunga’s government approached the 
Norwegian government in 1997.48 Norway was chosen as a small power with no 
strategic interests in the region, its long record of peace diplomacy, and because it 
was acceptable to both the government and the LTTE as well as India.49 The main 
objective in the early stages appears to have been ceasing hostilities and beginning a 
process of talks, with no clear commitment on either side to a ‘constitutional’ 
engagement.      
 
The Norwegian-facilitated peace process between the UNF government and the LTTE 
began with the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), signed between the two parties on 22nd 
February 2002. It formally ended on 16th January 2008, but it had effectively been 
dead months if not years before that. 50  In fact, there had been no meaningful 
engagement between the two parties after 2005, when the attempt to jointly deal with 
the aftermath of the Asian tsunami proved unsuccessful. Fighting had progressively 
escalated from early 2006 onwards, so much so that from May 2007 onwards the Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), set up under the CFA, ceased making 
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determinations over the increasingly widespread violations of the CFA by both 
parties.    
 
Two key factors are generally adduced to explain why the two parties agreed to a 
ceasefire.51 For the government, it had become clear that President Kumaratunga’s 
‘War for Peace’ strategy had failed to make the expected military gains let alone 
defeat the LTTE. The LTTE had a series of battleground gains, which secured control 
over substantial territory and cut off the Sri Lankan forces’ supply lines to the north, 
and its terrorist attacks in the south, notably on the country’s only international airport 
in July 2001, proved devastating. In 2001, the economy went into contraction (1.4% 
negative growth) for the first time since independence and the Central Bank warned 
that “the country cannot continue to bear the cost of prolonged war, and hence, a 
speedy resolution of the conflict is essential.”52 Morale of the armed forces was low, 
and the country at large was war weary. These factors led to Wickremesinghe’s 
victory in the December 2001 election on the promise to enter into a ceasefire with 
the LTTE, to commence negotiations on a political settlement, and to rebuild the 
economy.  
 
The LTTE for its part was pushed towards a ceasefire by domestic and international 
factors. By December 2001, it had made sufficient territorial and military gains to feel 
that it had strategic parity with the government, and could enter a process of 
negotiations from a position of strength. But it was also coming under considerable 
international pressure in the post-9/11 environment against terrorism, with several 
proscriptions against it in major countries and other international measures aimed at 
curtailing its funding and arms procurement networks. There was now little tolerance 
and no legitimacy accorded to those who practiced terrorism.53  
 
When the CFA was signed, President Kumaratunga protested vehemently that she had 
been not been consulted. While it was perhaps understandable that the UNF 
government, desirous of rapid progress in the aftermath of the election, had excluded 
her, this was an ominous portent of how the government’s two power centres would 
be unable to work together on the peace process in the future. The first round of talks 
took place in September 2002 in Thailand, with five further rounds at regular intervals 
until the last in March 2003 in Japan.  The third round, in December 2002 in Oslo, is 
especially significant for the present discussion.  
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As direct engagement got underway, the LTTE was keen to address urgent issues 
directly impacting on the daily lives of people of the northeast initially, for which it 
demanded a formalised interim administration, and only then deal with matters 
concerning constitutional change. The government and the international community, 
while initially sympathetic to this, would perhaps have preferred to work on 
substantive matters much earlier. But in hoping to keep the LTTE on-board, the issue 
of an interim administrative structure for the northeast under LTTE control came to 
dominate the agenda. While a Joint Task Force was mooted in the first round, it was 
clear this would possibly be open to legal challenges as well as opposition from a 
hostile president; consequently, in the second round in October 2002, more informal 
joint committees were established. These were: the Subcommittee on Immediate 
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), the Subcommittee on De-escalation 
and Normalisation, and the Subcommittee on Political Matters, which was chaired by 
the heads of the two delegations, Professor G.L. Peiris MP for the government, and 
Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s senior theoretician.54  
 
As noted, the talks were between the government of Sri Lanka (or more precisely, its 
UNF component) and the LTTE, which claimed to be the sole authentic representative 
of the Tamil people. While the Muslims would ideally have liked separate 
representation, the LTTE would not agree. The leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress (SLMC), which was part of the UNF, served in the government delegation.    
 
The most significant development in these talks for the purposes of the present 
discussion was the agreement reached on 5th December 2002 in Oslo with regard to 
the outlines of a constitutional settlement. This was to form the basis for further 
discussions within the Subcommittee on Political Matters. The official communiqué 
issued by the Norwegian government recorded the agreement as follows:  
 
“The parties agreed on a working outline defining the objective as well as a 
number of substantive political issues for negotiation … Responding to a 
proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a 
solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of 
historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal 
structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the 
solution has to be acceptable to all communities … Guided by this objective, 
the parties agreed to initiate discussions on substantive political issues such as, 
but not limited to: Power-sharing between the centre and the region, as well as 
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within the centre; Geographical region; Human Rights protection; Political 
and administrative mechanisms; Public finance; Law and order.”55  
 
While lacking in detail and precision, this brief statement was, at this stage, both 
appropriate and realistic in outlining only broad principles. But it did reflect 
symbolically some significant concessions from both sides. In ethno-national 
conflicts, symbols are often as salient as policies and institutions; seemingly positive 
constitutional concepts like ‘federalism’ or ‘unitary state’ or ‘self-determination’ may 
be highly charged ethno-national symbols for both sides. Thus, the use of such terms 
often denotes a kinesic significance outside any more rationalist frame of analysis. 
Nevertheless, certain specific issues in the final sentence, especially ‘geographical 
region’, related to long-standing and central issues in the conflict, but because the 
discussions on these issues never progressed into any detailed constitutional 
negotiations, it is impossible to determine what the Oslo principles, subject to further, 
difficult negotiation, might have produced as a concrete institutional design.  
 
That said, a joint statement of intent seemed to portend a promising start to future 
constitutional negotiations. The two striking concessions were: first, the LTTE’s 
agreeing to explore a solution based on a united Sri Lankan state, breaking from their 
commitment to a separate state; and secondly, the Sri Lankan government agreeing to 
contemplate federalism despite being constitutionally wedded to a unitary state. The 
federal but single Sri Lankan state would also be asymmetric, in recognising the right 
to ‘internal self-determination’ of Tamil-speaking peoples in their areas of historical 
habitation – a right not recognised for any other province – even though secession 
was implicitly ruled out by limiting this right to its internal aspect. Recognition that 
the territorial unit in the northeast was based on a Tamil right to internal self-
determination may well have translated into greater powers for it than the other 
provinces, resulting in an asymmetrical federation. But as noted, no further discussion 
on these matters took place.  
 
While avoiding inflammatory rhetoric, the communiqué nonetheless addressed the 
spirit of Tamil claims to autonomy, recognition, and representation. On the other 
hand, the avoidance of terms like ‘Tamil nation’ and ‘traditional homeland’, the 
principle that any solution must be acceptable to all communities, and the putative 
safeguard against secession and the disintegration of the state, were all meant to 
assuage Sinhala and Muslim fears. This was therefore a distillation of the essence of a 
constitutional settlement that could meet the competing ethnic demands within an 
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institutional balance that took account of the requirements of both unity and 
diversity.56   
 
The strength of the Oslo statement arguably was that it provided a good basis, 
however skeletal, for the Subcommittee on Political Matters to build upon by fleshing 
out the principles and exploring institutional options for a new constitution. Optimism 
was also stimulated by the position of the two co-chairs, Peiris and Balasingham, as 
moderates within their respective parties who seemed to have a reasonable working 
relationship. In the event, however, this subcommittee was never properly constituted 
and never met, so the hopes generated by Oslo were soon scattered.57 In the single 
meeting Peiris and Balasingham held after Oslo, they decided that the subcommittee 
would commence discussion on fiscal and financial issues first. It is unclear how this 
decision was reached, and it would have been difficult to discuss such issues without 
knowing the overall federal scheme, including the allocation of competences. It seems 
likely that they regarded fiscal matters as technical and less politically charged than, 
for example, the territorial re-demarcation of the northeast, human rights, or police 
powers.   
 
The government was attacked by Sinhala nationalists in the south for agreeing to 
federalism and self-determination, which they saw as synonymous with separatist 
demands. The LTTE too began to backtrack on the Oslo principles almost 
immediately, emphasising that the intention was merely to ‘explore’ the matters 
mentioned in the statement, and that the parties had not reached a final agreement. It 
stated that if the government did not or could not deliver the promised autonomy in an 
acceptable manner, then Tamils would reserve their right to external self-
determination. It has sometimes been speculated that Balasingham exceeded his brief 
in agreeing to federalism, to which Prabhakaran would never agree, which would 
explain the LTTE’s backsliding on Oslo immediately after they agreed to it. While 
certainly a likely scenario, there is no evidence with which to prove this. What is 
however clearer is that by this time the LTTE was becoming concerned that it was 
being led into a ‘peace trap’ by the Sri Lankan government and international 
community, whereby it would be locked into a constitutional process which, while 
offering some amorphous prospect of autonomy, would progressively limit its 
political options, especially with regard to secession. Moreover, given the precarious 
power balance of cohabitation within the Sri Lankan government, it was also (quite 
justifiably) sceptical about the UNF government’s capacity to deliver the radical 
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constitutional changes promised. Rather than building upon the positive gains of Oslo, 
therefore, both parties increasingly put constitutional issues aside, while the lack of 
progress on normalisation and reconstruction took centre-stage.  
 
By mid 2003, the LTTE withdrew from the talks claiming that the internationalisation 
of the peace process favoured only the Sri Lankan government, with no concomitant 
benefits of international legitimacy for itself. It insisted again that a suitable interim 
administration for the northeast under its sole control be set up, so that it could deliver 
reconstruction and have an institutional basis as the representative of the Tamil 
people. The government agreed in principle and during mid-2003 made three different 
proposals for an interim administration, all of which the LTTE rejected. The 
government’s proposals reflected both legal constraints of the constitution and the 
severe opposition in the south to an interim administration for the LTTE, but they 
went to the utmost limit in trying to accommodate the latter’s demands.58 After the 
last of these was rejected, the government invited the LTTE to propose its own 
framework, and the LTTE made its proposals for an Interim Self-Governing 
Authority (ISGA) in November 2003. The ISGA, which was to be in sole control of 
the LTTE, was to be vested with ‘plenary powers’ to administer the northeast as if it 
were a constitutionally established government.59  
 
While ostensibly a proposal for an interim administration, it was clear that the ISGA 
was much more. It was an attempt not only to institutionalise the political and military 
power in LTTE-controlled areas, but also to reinforce the LTTE’s dominance over 
both government and civil society in those areas. In centralising authority in the 
unelected LTTE, the proposal paradoxically imitated the centralising pathology of the 
Sri Lankan state, and worse, given the LTTE’s record of violent intolerance of dissent 
and political pluralism within the Tamil community, the ISGA proposal caused 
serious concern from the perspective of democracy and human rights. It effectively 
sought to reframe negotiations on a final constitutional settlement from the 
federalisation contemplated at Oslo to more of a confederal model.60 In short, it was 
clear to its many critics that the LTTE had not abandoned its goal of a separate state 
and that anything less would merely be treated as a stepping-stone to that goal at some 
future point. This serious doubt regarding the LTTE’s commitment to the federalist 
Oslo principles fatally undermined advocates of federalism and power-sharing in the 
south. Both, legitimate concerns and political opportunism, therefore ensured a storm 
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of protest in the south when the LTTE’s proposal was published, and President 
Kumaratunga used the occasion to take over three key ministries including defence by 
dismissing their UNF ministers without consulting Prime Minister Wickremesinghe.  
 
Attempts to resolve or mitigate the crisis within the government proved unsuccessful. 
The president dissolved parliament in January for fresh elections in April 2004, at 
which the UNF was defeated. For this election, President Kumaratunga created an 
electoral alliance, the United Peoples Freedom Front (UPFA), made up of southern 
parties opposed to the peace process and federal-type power-sharing, even though her 
views about both were more in line with her vanquished rival Wickremesinghe. 
Ironically, she tried to resurrect the peace process after the election, but her insistence 
that any interim administration must be part of a final constitutional settlement found 
no favour with the LTTE, for whom an interim administration was a condition 
precedent to negotiations on a final settlement. In this way, opposition from both the 
LTTE and the president’s new parliamentary allies prevented any resumption of the 
peace process.  
 
During this period of fruitless engagement between the new government and the 
LTTE, the Asian tsunami struck Sri Lanka on Boxing Day 2004, with some of the 
worst devastation occurring along the north-eastern coastline. This created an 
opportunity for the government and LTTE to jointly respond to the disaster, and 
perhaps build on that co-operation to restart some form of constitutional negotiations. 
Given the mutual recognition of the need for joint action, as well as international 
pressure for some shared institutional basis for the disbursement of relief funds, the 
two parties fairly expeditiously agreed an institutional structure called the Post-
Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). 61  However, the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the hard-line party of Sinhala nationalists with whom 
President Kumaratunga had gone into coalition before the 2004 general election, 
challenged the constitutionality of this. In a highly controversial determination in July 
2005, the Supreme Court found that some aspects of the P-TOMS arrangement 
violated the constitution, in particular that its spending powers would infringe 
parliament’s exclusive control over public finance.62 That signalled the end of the P-
TOMS, as well as any prospect of further co-operation between the two parties. 
Moreover, the LTTE was widely suspected in August 2005 of assassinating 
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Kumaratunga’s highly respected Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, an ethnic 
Tamil, and the government reintroduced the proscription on the LTTE.63  
 
President Kumaratunga’s two terms in office came to an end in 2005, and in the 
ensuing presidential election, her prime minister and successor Mahinda Rajapaksa 
narrowly defeated Ranil Wickremesinghe by a majority of 50.29% to 48.43%. 64 
While Rajapaksa initially adopted a conciliatory stance with regard to the LTTE and 
the peace process, his ideological orientation was clearly Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
and committed to the unitary state.65 Especially after the Kadirgamar assassination, he 
also tapped into hardening attitudes in the south towards the LTTE, with the 
Wickremesinghe government now widely seen as having appeased a terrorist 
organisation that was irredeemably separatist. Controversially, the LTTE had 
enforced a boycott of the presidential election in the areas under its control and this 
decisively benefitted Rajapaksa in the presidential election, given that this Tamil vote 
would have gone to the more conciliatory Wickremesinghe otherwise. Had 
Wickremesinghe won, the subsequent course of history could have been dramatically 
different. Unsubstantiated allegations suggest there may have been some secret 
understanding on the boycott between Rajapaksa and the LTTE, but it seems clear 
that the LTTE had by 2005 concluded that a resumed peace process with 
Wickremesinghe in full control of the government and enjoying considerable 
international standing, especially in the west, would not be in its interests. It had 
consolidated its military strength and territorial presence during the previous few 
years of the ceasefire, and seems to have calculated that it could hold its own against a 
hostile government led by Rajapaksa.   
 
The parties did meet for talks in 2006, but neither was interested in negotiations and 
the CFA was effectively dead with daily violations and significant military clashes 
between the two sides. The Supreme Court made its own unhelpful contribution by 
declaring unlawful the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces effected under 
the terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord, on an application made by members of the 
JVP. 66  Although the NEPC had not been operational since 1991, it was highly 
significant that the new Rajapaksa regime was increasingly willing to undo past 
commitments with regard to the Tamil territorial claim. From mid 2006 onwards, the 
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military conflict escalated, and by 2007, it was unambiguously a situation of war, 
with the government clearing the Eastern Province of the LTTE. The government 
formally abrogated the CFA in January 2008 and the final phase of the Sri Lankan 
war commenced in the north, to conclude in May 2009 with the total defeat of the 
LTTE amidst allegations of serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law from both sides.      
 
The Outcomes of the Process 
 
The Norwegian-facilitated peace process failed in its central purpose: to find a 
constitutional settlement for Sri Lanka’s ethno-territorial cleavage. This legitimised 
critics of the peace process and a negotiated settlement, and enthroned a government 
hostile to the accommodation of Tamil grievances.  President Rajapaksa’s war victory 
against the LTTE won him political capital – beyond what any other post-
independence Sri Lankan leader had had – with which he could have pursued 
reconciliation and reforms. But any expectation of Rajapaksa’s capacity for 
magnanimity and statesmanship was soon extinguished. Instead, a crude form of 
unadulterated Sinhala-Buddhist triumphalism became the leitmotif of the post-war 
state. Rather than offering devolution and democracy, in September 2010, the regime 
enacted the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 67  which abolished the 
presidential two-term limit, and significantly weakened other constitutional restraints 
on presidential power. This form of ‘abusive constitutionalism’ 68  was further 
extended with the impeachment of the Chief Justice in 2013 when the Supreme Court 
tried to ensure the procedural validity of government legislation.69  
 
The country’s constitutional framework was thus altered to reflect the political 
dominance of the Rajapaksa regime: propounding a highly chauvinist reinterpretation 
of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism; rampantly using patronage, populism, and 
corruption as means of mobilising its political majority; and deploying legal 
authoritarianism and extra-legal violence to ensure control. The military victory 
against the LTTE was repetitively portrayed as the triumph of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
owners of the state against the impertinent Tamil minority. The use of ancient 
Sinhala-Buddhist chronicles, the inflammatory invocation of their myths and symbols, 
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and their hegemonic tropes of state, territory, race and religion, became the dominant 
political and cultural discourse of the south, propagated not merely by the state but 
also by a triumphalist media and intelligentsia. Like the heroic warrior-kings of 
folklore, Rajapaksa had reunified the island and restored the primacy of the Sinhala-
Buddhist nation, overcoming the depredations of a powerful Tamil rebellion.70 
 
Such regimes find validation and electoral sustenance by invoking a permanent 
enemy, so in the absence of the LTTE, not only Tamils but also the Muslim minority 
became demonised ‘others’ within, while the UN and international community more 
broadly were demonised for insisting on accountability for alleged atrocity crimes of 
the Rajapaksa regime. Useful and moderate policy recommendations made by bodies 
appointed by Rajapaksa himself, such as the All Party Representative Committee 
(APRC) 71  on devolution reforms, and the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission (LLRC) on reconciliation policies, were ignored. At the height of the 
Rajapaksa administration’s popularity, the new control regime seemed capable of 
permanently destroying Sri Lanka’s – brittle but long-held – democratic traditions, 
and altering forever the nature of the Sri Lankan state itself. The pervasive 
undermining of the rule of law endangered the state’s institutional capacity to check 
the regime’s excesses, including the unprecedented nepotism and kleptocratic 
corruption. However, these excesses and especially the extravagant corruption in turn 
ensured a major decline in its popularity within its own core constituency among the 
Sinhalese, so that Rajapaksa was defeated in the presidential election of January 2015 
by the common opposition promising major constitutional and governance reforms.  
 
While the new government of President Maithripala Sirisena is markedly more 
moderate and conciliatory, the parties behind his victory were careful to avoid any 
reference to Tamil and other minority demands in building its coalition of political 
and civic forces against Rajapaksa, focussing initially instead on presidential and 
governance reforms. The new government’s first reform act, the Nineteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution passed in May 2015, focussed entirely on reducing 
and restructuring presidential powers.72 While the TNA and other minority parties 
supported Sirisena’s candidacy unconditionally, given that he could not have 
prevailed without the support of the minorities, there is an implicit but strong 
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expectation that devolution and power-sharing reforms building upon the existing 
framework of the Thirteenth Amendment will be addressed in the new constitution 
currently being discussed in the Constitutional Assembly process. The manifesto of 
Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s winning coalition, the United National Front for 
Good Governance, in the August 2015 parliamentary election promised ‘maximum 





The Sri Lankan peace process from 2002 to about 2005 is disappointing overall, 
adding to the countless failed attempts since independence at constitutionally 
accommodating the country’s ethno-territorial cleavage. However, its unintended 
outcomes changed the nature and circumstances of the conflict radically. The 
breakdown in the process led to the resumption of military conflict with the eventual 
defeat of a credible armed adversary to the state. Since 2015, the absence of the LTTE 
and the Rajapaksas has removed the distracting spectre of both terrorism and 
authoritarianism, which should improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement 
(although of course unlike the LTTE, a Rajapaksa revival in the politics of the south 
is not outside the realm of the possible). So while the new context is very different 
and more promising, some lessons can be drawn from the peace process, which could 
have relevance in renewed attempts at constitutional reforms to address the territorial 
issue. 
 
With the defeat of the LTTE and its ideological commitment to secession, the Tamil 
political claim to territory has reverted to the more traditional demand for federal-type 
autonomy, though some Tamil groups still insist that their nationality claim be 
recognised within a federal framework.73 It is now uncontested that any settlement 
will be within a united Sri Lankan state. This therefore revives the salience of the 
principles enunciated in Oslo in 2003, and even if provocative terms like ‘nation’, 
‘self-determination’ and ‘federalism’ are avoided for practical political reasons, it is 
clear their conceptual substance will have to inform the next round of constitutional 
reforms.  
 
                                                 
73 Tamil People’s Council, Report of the Sub-Committee on Finding a Political Solution to the National 
Question, 31st January 2016, available at: 
http://www.tamilpeoplescouncil.org/Press%20Release(19-12-
2015)/Highlevelframework.pdf (last accessed 4th April 2017) 
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The Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism that opposed the peace process and its federalist 
direction, and which saw a massive upsurge in the aftermath of the war, may have 
receded somewhat, but it would be a cardinal error to discount the continuing political 
force of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in the south. Even in the great reformist 
moment of early 2015, more expansively liberal plans to abolish the executive 
presidency were thwarted by parties and individuals who wished to retain a strong 
presidency, which comports with deeper Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist perspectives on 
the nature and form of the Sri Lankan state.74  
 
Two features of Sri Lanka’s political culture were highlighted in the failure of the 
peace process: the hyper-competitive nature of party politics, and the elitism of 
constitutional politics.  These both constrict the space for public participation and 
deliberation in constitutional choices, with fatal consequences for building public 
consensus around a negotiated constitutional settlement. The presidential and 
governance reforms of 2015 enjoyed a clear mandate and very broad public consensus 
but the process was closed, opaque, and almost derailed by partisan politicking.  In 
bringing the two main parties (and others) together in the current government of 
national unity, President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, seem 
therefore to be addressing the first of these problems. But it appears that the 
Constitutional Assembly process, after a period of engagement with civil society and 
the public, has again retreated into the traditional secretive habits of Sri Lankan 
political culture.     
 
Although Sri Lankan politics reflects a proliferation of both ideology and ethnicity 
based parties, governments are always formed with either the United National Party 
(UNP) or the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) as their core and main element. This 
was the case with Wickremesinghe’s UNF and with Kumaratunga’s PA and UPFA 
during the peace process. Despite the substantial underlying consensus between 
Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe with regard to the process and the substance of a 
constitutional settlement, neither was able to resist the pressures and temptations of 
partisan advantage. In this, they were demonstrating not only the traditionally poor 
quality of political leadership shown by their predecessors but also their inability to 
transcend the established trajectory of Sri Lankan party politics, characterised by 
ethnic outbidding between the two major parties and their allies, and the zero-sum 
nature of electoral competition. Normal politics might be conducted on such a basis, 
which may even be seen as healthy democratic competitiveness offering greater 
choice to the citizen. But in addressing the constitutional challenge of uniting an 
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ethnically and territorially divided polity and providing a stable basis for the conduct 
of pluralistic constitutional politics, such a political culture has proved disastrous. The 
failed peace process in this sense is only one instance in a longer history of a systemic 
failing in the structure of politics. 
 
Once the exclusive preserve of a wealthy and anglicised elite, Sri Lankan politics has 
hugely democratised since the 1950s in opening the vocation of politics to all classes. 
This however has not meant the democratisation and modernisation of the culture of 
politics. The otherwise politically literate population only really plays a part in the 
democratic process during elections, whereas in-between the institutions of 
government function without much transparency and public involvement. This culture 
was replicated in the peace process, and was exacerbated by the LTTE’s primitive 
hostility to political pluralism, even within its own community. As the ICG piquantly 
noted, “For the most part, the […] peace process consisted of discussions in hotels 
abroad between small groups of men from only two of the parties to the conflict.”75  
 
As noted, this lesson goes unheeded today. Opinion polls over the period of the 
current constitutional reform process consistently demonstrate very low levels of 
public awareness and engagement.76 As a recent statement of civil society groups 
observed, the government’s failures of political communication, generate “public 
apathy and allow anti-reform forces to control the political narrative.” Noting the 
regrouping of Rajapaksa-led anti-reform forces, which “would hold back the social, 
political, economic, and constitutional progress of our country for decades”, the 
statement urged the government to “act fast to regain the initiative…and ensure 
conducive conditions for the constitutional referendum to come.”77 
 
Even though both the government and the LTTE established official Peace 
Secretariats, there was no credible programme by either party to engage the public, 
share information, encourage debate and discussion, promote inter-communal 
dialogue, and in these ways build public support for the process. While civil society 
organisations attempted such outreach, they were a poor substitute for political parties 
or government. In this context, gratuitous opportunities were provided for spoilers in 
southern politics to exploit Sinhala fears through misinformation and distortion, such 
as the way in which the federal idea was transmogrified into a synonym for 
                                                 
75 ICG (2006). 
76 See Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) polling data from February and October 2016 and March 
2017: http://constitutionalreforms.org (last accessed 4th April 2017.   
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appeasement and separatism without any meaningful counter-response from the 
government. In the north and east, the LTTE merely used the opportunity to eliminate 
dissent, promote the personality cult of its leader, and orchestrate political events 
aimed at whipping up an infantile form of nationalist hysteria amongst Tamils. These 
approaches to public involvement had the predictable consequences of eroding 
southern support and hardening northern attitudes, and thereby undercut the crucial 
element of public support for the process.   
 
A brief word on the international role in the process is also necessary, an aspect that 
has been extensively discussed elsewhere.78 The Norwegian Government was invited 
by both parties to serve as facilitators and not mediators, which determined a 
relatively non-interventionary role from the outset. This meant that beyond facilitation 
of other international expertise, for example through the Forum of Federations 
advising the parties on federalism at Oslo, the Norwegians had little substantive input. 
While this was appropriate for political and constitutional matters due to issues of 
ownership and credit, some commentators have pointed out that the facilitator’s 
minimalist role especially in the form and content of the CFA weakened the process. 
In particular, the CFA included neither human rights guarantees nor enforcement 
mechanisms. This allowed the parties to act with impunity, especially the LTTE, 
which as reported by the SLMM was responsible for the vast majority of violations of 
both the CFA and human rights. This validated the spoilers and critics of the peace 
process, and seriously if not fatally undermined the legitimacy and public confidence 
in it.  
 
An issue related to the last point is the extreme desire of the drivers of the current 
constitutional reform process to be seen to be conducting a nationally-owned process, 
a sensitivity directly derived from the experience of the peace process. However, in 
this pursuit of national ownership and authenticity, it has also meant that the political 
elite sees a need not merely to do without international expertise but also to exclude 
local civil society groups from the process. This would have consequences for the 
quality of the technical deliberations and the ultimate design choices to be made.    
 
A deeper question in any retrospective review of the peace process is whether it was 
doomed to failure from the start. The absence of a southern consensus, the 
uncompromising attitude of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism, and not least, the 
recalcitrant nature of the LTTE and in particular the obdurate commitment of 
Prabhakaran to both separatism and violence, have all fostered the view in some 
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quarters that, notwithstanding the considerable social and economic costs of military 
conflict, the adversaries had not yet reached the stage where negotiations were the 
only political option open to them. There is considerable credence that can be 
attached to such a view. However, the circumstances of late 2001 in which the peace 
process began, outlined above, reminds us that there were many incentives for both 
the state and the LTTE to enter into a facilitated ceasefire and negotiations. Motives 
might be questioned, but without both the state and LTTE agreeing, the peace process 
would not even have begun. Once underway, however, its many weaknesses were 
unable to withstand the major pressures out on it, and these might be summarised in 
the following terms.    
 
Elite-led processes of constitutional transition are untenable without public 
acceptance, which in turn necessitates sustained efforts to inform and involve the 
polity at large, and engage and contain antagonistic constituencies within it. The 
design of the peace process reflected the elitist nature of Sri Lankan politics, but 
without transcending its extreme partisan dynamics. The negotiations and their 
content were barely understood by people at large, and the lack of public awareness 
and information about efforts to resolve the conflict reinforced suspicion and mistrust 
among ethnic communities. The process never matured enough for the difficult 
negotiations on concrete details of a constitutional settlement to begin. But the 
process did not even begin to create the pre-constitutional political consensus 
involving the key stakeholders (including potential spoilers) about the need for peace 
and justice, and the rationale for a negotiated settlement.  
 
To ensure the legitimacy of the process and to allay mutual suspicions among the 
antagonistic communities, there has to be some sort of shared normative framework 
that determines the bounds of acceptable behaviour. A joint commitment to shared 
and expressly articulated human rights norms may have been one such basis in the Sri 
Lankan context, but such an agreement proved impossible due to the reluctance of the 
parties, and especially the LTTE, and the inability of the facilitators to compel the 
parties.  
 
A minimum consensus on the overarching importance of peace through a 
constitutional transition assumes crucial significance among parties who are otherwise 
in electoral competition with each other. As Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu noted, 
“Political competition can continue to be possible on the basis of differing 
approaches, emphases and tactics, rather than on the strategic objective of a peace 
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settlement through talks.” 79  Without this crucial requirement, the constitutional 
transition itself falls victim to the vagaries of electoral competition and ethnic 
outbidding.  
 
Sri Lanka has been an uninterrupted procedural democracy since 1931, but the 
substantive content of its democracy has been unable to transcend the problem of 
ethnicised majoritarianism to accommodate minority claims in a plural polity, 
rendering it a deeply divided society. The dominance of ethnicity and sectional 
nationalisms in democratic politics, and their competing historical, cultural and 
political claims, often make even routine policy decisions the subject of fundamental 
disagreement. This has entailed the constitutional evolution of the Sri Lankan state in 
ways that have hardened the majority’s tendency to control the state, and the principal 
minority’s resolve to resist that hegemony. Overcoming this deep ethno-national and 
territorial division through normative and institutional alternatives constitutes the 
central challenge if Sri Lanka is to build a stable and just constitutional order. The 
peace process commencing with the ceasefire of 2002 was aimed addressing this 
challenge, but was itself unable to surmount the structural and systemic problems of 
the Sri Lankan polity. 
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